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Assessing U.S. Progress in the Iran War
On 6 March 2026, one week into the war, Michael Singh published Assessing U.S. Progress in the Iran War at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a US think tank that studies the Middle East. Singh is its managing director. He writes that the United States and Israel share some aims and not others, and that Washington had already decided not to use ground forces. An American family should care because he treats US soldiers on Iranian soil as a choice already refused. He says that choice may be why Iran can still fire missiles and drones.
Evidence rating: MODERATE. This rates the judgment of Michael Singh, managing director of The Washington Institute, one week into the war: that Iran's continued fire "may be a function of the U.S. decision not to employ ground forces," and that removing the buried uranium likely cannot be done by strikes alone.
What the article says
Singh writes that the United States seemed to have four aims: destroy Iran's navy, destroy its missiles, stop a nuclear weapon, and stop support to proxy groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. He writes that administration officials, including President Donald Trump in his first remarks on the war, had hinted at regime change, and then left that message out.
He writes that American and Israeli aims overlap but are not the same. He writes that Israel is more focused on Iran's missiles, and more intent on regime change. He describes Israel as focused, in the early days, on killing political and military leaders, most notably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He later writes that Khamenei is dead, and that the direction of the change is still unknown. Those are his claims about the fighting, not a court finding.
The ground-force line is his explanation for why Iranian fire had not stopped.
Iran's ability to continue firing missiles and drones is concerning, and may be a function of the U.S. decision not to employ ground forces, which is likely rooted more in politics than strategy.
Michael Singh, The Washington Institute, 6 March 2026.
He also writes that Iran's nuclear sites were badly damaged in June 2025 strikes by the United States and Israel, and that enriched uranium is thought to be buried in the rubble. He writes that some tasks, including removing that uranium or checking that other sites are not a proliferation risk, likely cannot be done by strikes alone. He does not say who would do that work.
He warns against treating only the largest aims as victory. He writes that the belief that victory requires maximalist aims led to costly wars of many years in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that the Trump administration should not repeat that error in Iran.
What other reporting and posts add
Was it a decision? The official words that week were looser. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth "would not rule out" ground troops on 2 March, per The Washington Post. The Washington Post, 2 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t56__v668.md) On 7 March, a financial-news account quoted Trump on ground troops: "Could there be? Possibly, for very good reason." @financialjuice, 7 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t50__v597.md) The same week, press secretary Karoline Leavitt said ground troops or a draft are "not part of the current plan right now," as PolitiFact reported. PolitiFact, 9 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t48__v574.md) So "not now" was the official line, rather than a firm decision against.
Singh's point about the uranium, echoed by Israel's leader. Singh wrote that removing Iran's buried uranium likely cannot be done by strikes alone. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the same in May, on CBS's 60 Minutes: "You go in, and you take it out," adding that Trump had told him "'I want to go in there.'" CBS News, 10 May 2026. (capture: twitter/t13__v145.md) Two weeks after Singh wrote, Netanyahu said at a Jerusalem press conference that "there has to be a ground component, as well." Just the News, 20 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t13__v147.md)
What it shows
One week in, a Washington think tank's managing director made two points this section follows through the whole war. First, the air war could not stop Iran's missiles and drones, and he tied that to the absence of ground forces. Second, the buried uranium "likely cannot be done by strikes alone." He also noted that Israel was "more intent on regime change" than Washington. Netanyahu said in March "there has to be a ground component" and in May "You go in, and you take it out," while Israel's press reported Israeli infantry would stay home. The work Singh says bombs cannot do falls to American soldiers, and the Pentagon was planning for it within weeks (see Air War Is Not Enough and Kharg Island and the Uranium Raid).
Check it yourself
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Status: Donald Trump is alive. Michael Singh is alive.
Who is writing, for a new reader: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is a Washington think tank founded in 1985 that studies the Middle East; it is generally seen as close to pro-Israel views and hawkish on Iran. Michael Singh, its managing director, was senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. One week after the United States and Israel began bombing Iran on 28 February 2026, he wrote that the US had decided against ground forces, and that this might be why Iran kept firing. That is a pro-war analyst suggesting the limit may be a weakness, which is worth knowing when reading later calls for ground troops.
Research captures: twitter/t56__v668.md, twitter/t50__v597.md, twitter/t48__v574.md, twitter/t13__v145.md, twitter/t13__v147.md
Last Updated: 2026-09-26