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Trump's Iran Blunder Shows Strategy Can Defeat Firepower
On 13 July 2026, the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, posted Trump's Iran Blunder Shows Strategy Can Defeat Firepower by Hal Brands. The page says the column is Bloomberg Opinion. Brands argues that US and Israeli firepower hurt Iran and still failed, because the regime survived. An American family should care because he says President Donald Trump wanted a maximal result, including something like the collapse of the regime and a reopened Strait of Hormuz, the sea lane for oil leaving the Persian Gulf, and ruled out using ground troops.
Evidence rating: MODERATE. This rates a named commentator's analysis, a Bloomberg Opinion column posted by the American Enterprise Institute, that Trump "sought maximalist objectives" while ruling out ground troops, and hesitated to order the operations Brands thinks were needed to secure Hormuz.
What the article says
Brands writes that the force-on-force fight was one-sided and the strategic result was not. He writes that the United States and Israel killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of other leaders, sank Iran's navy, damaged its defense industry and nuclear sites, and hunted drones and missiles. He writes that US and Israeli losses of planes and personnel were modest, and that the two air forces seized control of Iran's skies. Those are his claims about the campaign, not a casualty ledger printed here.
He writes that the regime is still in place, harder-line after Khamenei's death, and still armed. He writes that Iran showed it can squeeze Gulf energy sites and the Strait of Hormuz. He writes that the threat of a global recession led Trump to a deal that halted the war, left the status of Hormuz ambiguous, and committed the regime to very little on the nuclear program. He presents that as Iran winning the contest in economic coercion.
He calls the ground-troop choice part of a gap between aims and means.
Trump sought maximalist objectives — the geopolitical surrender or collapse of the regime — but ruled out using ground troops.
Hal Brands, American Enterprise Institute, posting a Bloomberg Opinion column, 13 July 2026.
In the next sentences he writes that Trump vetoed the idea of sparking a Kurdish uprising, out of deference to Turkey, and then demanded that Iran reopen Hormuz but hesitated to order the operations Brands thinks were needed to secure the passage, such as ground forces or naval convoys, for fear of likely costs and casualties. He writes that there were good reasons for each of these limits. He also writes that they left a wide gap between what Trump hoped to achieve and the resources he was willing to commit.
What other reporting and posts add
Two days later, Trump named a different ground force. On 15 July, Trump told Fox News: "We have other people that will do the ground campaign for us," as CNN reported; he did not say who. See Trump weighing options for expanding military operations in Iran. The World Socialist Web Site, summarizing the Wall Street Journal that week, said Trump convened a Situation Room meeting "to discuss the potential seizure of Kharg Island and other territory along the Strait of Hormuz using U.S. troops." WSWS, 16 July 2026. (capture: twitter/t56__v668.md)
The Kurdish option Brands says Trump vetoed. A March plan for Iranian Kurdish fighters based in Iraq to move into Iran was widely reported. A September AI-assistant reply on X said it "never materialized into an actual offensive" and "collapsed months ago amid opposition and mixed signals"; a post summarizing Israeli reporting said "A joint plan for a Kurdish invasion of Iran collapsed after it leaked to media." Neither is an official source. @grok, 21 September 2026. (captures: twitter/t01__v010.md, twitter/t13__v156.md)
Israel's preference for Iranian, not American, boots. Israel's ambassador in Washington, Michael Leiter, had said in March: "our preference is for the boots on the ground to be those of the Iranians." Politico, 8 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t13__v145.md)
What it shows
Brands names the gap that drives this whole section: "maximalist objectives — the geopolitical surrender or collapse of the regime" pursued without the ground troops those objectives require. A gap like that closes one of two ways, by lowering the goal or by sending the soldiers. Two days after this column, the Situation Room discussed seizing Kharg Island and Hormuz territory "using U.S. troops," and the President said "we have other people that will do the ground campaign for us." Israel had already said through its ambassador that it wanted Iranian boots, and through its press that its own infantry would stay home. The regime-collapse goal is Israel's; the ground troops it needs would be American (see Air War Is Not Enough and Israel Keeps Its Infantry Home).
Check it yourself
No second source was opened for this page. The Bloomberg Opinion page linked from the AEI post was not opened.
Status: Donald Trump is alive. Hal Brands is alive.
Background for a new reader: the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a conservative Washington think tank; Hal Brands is a historian of strategy who writes a Bloomberg Opinion column. By mid-July 2026, the US-Israeli war on Iran that began on 28 February had killed Iran's supreme leader and wrecked much of its military, yet a spring deal had fallen apart and the regime was still standing. Brands's point is that Trump wanted the biggest result while refusing the costliest tool, ground troops. That gap is what put American soldiers back into the debate that month.
Research captures: twitter/t56__v668.md, twitter/t01__v010.md, twitter/t13__v156.md, twitter/t13__v145.md
Last Updated: 2026-09-26