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Iran: 'Weakling' or 'Hegemon'
On February 20, 2007, Anthony H. Cordesman, holder of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, circulated a review draft, Iran: 'Weakling' or 'Hegemon'. An American family should care because he warns that an invasion of Iran, if people rallied to the government instead of rising against it, would become a bloody war of attrition. He writes that tactical victories would not bring a lasting advantage. The draft is his analysis.
Evidence rating: MODERATE. The rating covers a February 2007 review draft by Anthony H. Cordesman of CSIS, circulated for comment, warning that an invasion of Iran meeting a nationalist response "would almost certainly turn into a bloody and pointless war of attrition."
What the article says
Cordesman argues that Iran should be judged by what its forces can do, not by guesses about what it intends. He says Iran is not a military weakling. He also says it is not a regional hegemon, meaning a power that could dominate its neighbors if those neighbors and the United States pushed back.
He describes Iran's own army, not an American force staged to attack: four corps and about 12 division equivalents, plus a large Revolutionary Guard land branch that he says is mostly infantry and conscripts. Much of the equipment, he writes, is worn.
The passage that bears on American soldiers is about someone invading Iran. He names two hard cases: defense of Iran's own territory, and Iraq. He describes Iran as a country of over 65 million people, with its cities in the center of the country.
any invasion of Iran that produced a strong nationalist response, rather than a broad-based uprising against the regime, would almost certainly turn into a bloody and pointless war of attrition.
Anthony H. Cordesman wrote that in the February 20, 2007 draft. He points to the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf Wars as the reason popular support decides this kind of fight. He adds that even major tactical victories would not offer a lasting advantage, and would tie the attacker down in exposed positions. He does not say the attacker would have to be the United States. He gives no U.S. troop number and no dollar cost in that passage.
He also writes that defeating Iran's conventional forces would not remove its ability to strike back with unconventional forces, proxies, or partners. He writes that such a war might, over time, push Iran to try harder to acquire nuclear weapons.
What other reporting and posts add
US intelligence, before the 2026 war, leaned toward "rally." According to a Washington Post report as relayed on X, a National Intelligence Council assessment completed a week before the war judged the Iranian government unlikely to be overthrown even by a large-scale US attack, and the divided opposition unlikely to take control. @UnplugTheEmpire, 7 March 2026. (capture: twitter/t13__v150.md)
Both readings, in September 2026. In a Fox News interview summarized by an X account, host Martha MacCallum relayed a regional source saying that overthrowing the regime means civil war and that nationalism rose after the 28 February attacks. The exiled Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi answered that when he called people into the streets, millions came out across 31 provinces, which he called unity, not fragmentation. @urgentintel, 23 September 2026. (capture: twitter/t13__v145.md) Iran's government, for its part, claimed huge volunteer numbers; an X summary in May called an "11 Million" figure unverified and said analysts saw such claims as "symbolic morale boosts for the Basij paramilitary rather than verified enlistments." X trend, 16 May 2026. (capture: twitter/t42__v494.md)
Iran's promised response to any landing. A former Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, was quoted by the World Socialist Web Site saying that if US forces seize Iranian territory, Iran should storm a US base "through a combined helicopter-borne and ground assault" and take American soldiers hostage. WSWS, 16 July 2026. (capture: twitter/t56__v668.md)
What it shows
One of Washington's most-cited military analysts warned in 2007 that invading Iran would likely produce "a bloody and pointless war of attrition" that even major victories would not end. In 2026, US intelligence reportedly judged the regime unlikely to fall even to a large US attack, and Iran's former foreign minister was quoted promising to take American soldiers hostage if US forces seized Iranian territory.
The warnings were on the record for two decades. The plans for raids, island seizures, and a uranium mission went ahead anyway. See Force-Planning Documents and Pentagon Ground Plans 2026.
Check it yourself
Center for Strategic and International Studies review draft, February 20, 2007: Iran: 'Weakling' or 'Hegemon'. No second source was opened for this page.
Why a 2007 draft paper matters now: Anthony Cordesman was for decades one of the most-cited military analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a large Washington defense think tank. His warning, that invading Iran would become "a bloody and pointless war of attrition" if Iranians rallied to their government rather than rising against it, is the core question behind every 2026 debate about American ground troops after the United States and Israel began bombing Iran on 28 February 2026. Would Iranians rise up, or rally?
Research captures: twitter/t13__v150.md, twitter/t13__v145.md, twitter/t42__v494.md, twitter/t56__v668.md
Last Updated: 2026-09-26