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Regime Change From the Air: What the War's Own Advocates Wrote

The 2026 war was launched with a goal larger than any bombing campaign has ever achieved: the fall of Iran's government. Israel's leaders said so openly. American officials hinted at it and then backed off. And the writers who supported the war, in Commentary, Tablet, the Jewish Chronicle, the Washington Institute, and Israel's own papers, spelled out the problem: toppling a government takes soldiers holding ground. This page collects what they wrote, because their words show where the war's logic leads.

The goal was regime change​

  • The Forward, Dan Perry, from Tel Aviv, 28 February 2026: Trump, announcing the strikes, set regime change as the aim and urged Iranians to take over their government. "Without a ground invasion — which is neither contemplated nor remotely plausible — the odds seem low" (The Forward).
  • Netanyahu, 19 March 2026: "you can't do revolutions from the air, that is true. ... there has to be a ground component, as well. There are many possibilities for this ground component, and I take the liberty of not sharing with you all those possibilities" (see Israeli Leaders on a Ground War).
  • Netanyahu, 4 September 2026: toppling Iran's regime "is the central mission still before us, but it is close. It is not impossible. It is within reach" (JNS).
  • The Jewish Chronicle, 30 July 2026: Netanyahu still wanted the goals he set on 28 February: destroy Iran's nuclear program, and create conditions on the ground for regime change (Jewish Chronicle).

What it takes, in their words​

  • John Podhoretz, Commentary, 28 February: "A regime-change war would effectively require us to go in on the ground in Tehran, take out the mullahs, and announce that a regency of some sort that would then lead to a new republic" (Commentary). He wrote that Trump had not announced that kind of war.
  • Eli Lake, Commentary, 13 March: "After all, without boots on the ground, neither the U.S. nor Israel will have the ability to shape the inevitable chaos that will result after the bombing stops." He added he would not be shocked if the Mossad had a plan for what comes next (Commentary).
  • Lazar Berman, Times of Israel, 23 March: air campaigns "can only do so much without complementary boots on the ground," quoting CSIS's Daniel Byman that to impose control "you need control of the ground" (Times of Israel).
  • Jonathan Schanzer, Commentary, 16 April: "without forces physically holding territory and forcing the regime in Iran to its knees, Trump has few viable options other than to punish the regime with an unrelenting torrent of withering blows from above" (Commentary).
  • Michael Singh, Washington Institute, 6 March: Iran's continued fire "may be a function of the U.S. decision not to employ ground forces, which is likely rooted more in politics than strategy" (Washington Institute).
  • Michael Froman, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 July: one path left to the president is to "put boots on the ground" to seize Kharg Island and a strip of the Hormuz coast, operations that "would put thousands of U.S. warfighters and prized naval assets at risk" (CFR).

Whose boots?​

The advocates split on the answer, and the split is the story.

Israel's answer was: not ours. Ambassador Michael Leiter: "I think that we need boots on the ground but they've got to be Iranian boots, and I think they're coming." Israel's Channel 12 reported that Israeli infantry would not take part in any ground operation. Hudson's Michael Doran, in Tablet, praised Israel as "one of the very few allies capable of independently prosecuting sustained, high-intensity military campaigns without requiring American ground troops or direct combat involvement" (Tablet, 13 April 2026). Five months later the same author wrote that eradicating Iran's arsenal "might require controlling the ground on which it sits," and that the United States would then own the aftermath (Tablet, 2 September 2026).

The Iranian uprising did not come. The Kurdish offensive did not come (see the Kurdish ground option). Israel's infantry would not come. What was left, when the advocates' logic ran out of other people, was the American soldier. Tucker Carlson said it plainly in March: "Israel would like us to commit ground troops, obviously. But it would take a lot to get us to do that" (Tucker Carlson Network, YouTube).

Those who said it would not happen​

Several analysts wrote that a US ground commitment was unlikely: Heritage's Asher Fredman ("It appears unlikely that there will be any substantial deployment of American ground troops"), retired Lt. Gen. Mark Schwartz in Israel Hayom ("Absolutely not. It would be extremely risky of us to do that"), and CNAS's Daniel Schneiderman. Hoover's Russell Berman wrote in September: "First and foremost, there has been no deployment of ground troops" (Hoover). Those judgments describe the president's hesitation, not the plans. In the same months, the Pentagon wrote the ground plans, sent the ground forces, and put more than 90 Americans on Iranian soil in April (see Americans on Iranian Soil). The advocates' own argument, that the goals require ground, is the pressure that keeps the plans alive.

Status: Benjamin Netanyahu is alive. Dan Perry is alive. John Podhoretz is alive. Eli Lake is alive. Lazar Berman is alive. Daniel Byman is alive. Jonathan Schanzer is alive. Michael Singh is alive. Michael Froman is alive. Michael Leiter is alive. Michael Doran is alive. Tucker Carlson is alive. Asher Fredman is alive. Mark Schwartz is alive. Russell Berman is alive.

Sources​

Last Updated: 2026-09-26

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