← Money, Oil, and the Cost
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the Iran War
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the other Gulf monarchies sit across the water from Iran, host American military bases, buy American weapons by the hundreds of billions of dollars, and have long seen Iran as their main rival. This page looks at the part they played: Saudi Arabia's crown prince privately lobbied for the 2026 attack alongside Israel, while telling Iran in public that he would not let his territory be used. It also shows what the Gulf got, and what it cost them.
Israel and Saudi Arabia: "an unusual pair"
On March 1, 2026, the day after the war began, Washington Post reporters Michael Birnbaum, John Hudson, Karen DeYoung, Natalie Allison, and Souad Mekhennet reported:
"U.S. intelligence assessments saw no imminent threat, but regional allies argued now was the time to strike."
"President Donald Trump launched Saturday's wide-ranging attack on Iran after a weeks-long lobbying effort by an unusual pair of U.S. allies in the Middle East — Israel and Saudi Arabia — according to four people familiar with the matter."
"Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made multiple private phone calls to Trump over the past month advocating a U.S. attack, despite his public support for a diplomatic solution, the four people said."
"Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, continued his long-running public campaign for U.S. strikes against what he views as an existential enemy of his country."
(as captured from an X search page, since the article link was not captured). In public, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told Iran's President Pezeshkian in February 2026 that Riyadh would not allow its airspace or territory to be used for military operations against Tehran (reported by the Saudi Press Agency, as noted in the same capture). What he said in public and what four people say he told the President in private point in opposite directions.
The Stimson Center, a nonpartisan Washington research group, concluded in August 2026 that "U.S. core security interests alone" did not motivate the war and that "allies, specifically Israel and Saudi Arabia, are a but-for cause" (Stimson, August 3, 2026). "But-for cause" means that without them, the war would not have happened.
The money ties
In May 2025, a year before the war, the White House announced what it billed as more than two trillion dollars in deals across three Gulf capitals. Inside was "a one hundred forty-two billion dollar arms package billed as the largest defense sales agreement in American history." The White House fact sheet listed $243.5 billion in named deals with Qatar, including "a ninety-six billion Boeing order for up to two hundred ten jets" and a $10 billion pledge around the Al Udeid air base (@SMO_VZ on X, September 12, 2026). Qatar also gave the President a Boeing 747-8 for use as Air Force One; Qatar denied seeking influence (Randy Ferrell on X, September 2, 2026). The Financial Times, as quoted in a captured analysis, reported that the UAE spent about $270 million on influence in Washington over a decade; Abu Dhabi denies several of the allegations (Eye OSINT on X, August 10, 2026).
"Help Israel" and the Gulf's second thoughts
The Gulf's official line changed with the war. In June 2025, according to FDD's own summary, "Gulf states condemned Israeli action and lamented the Trump administration's decision to strike Iran's nuclear program"; by March 2026, after Iranian missiles struck them, "Gulf rhetoric is notably different" (FDD's Iran Program on X, March 1, 2026). Qatar's former prime minister Hamad bin Jassim warned, as rendered in a captured post, that America was pushing Gulf states toward war with Iran "just to sell us weapons." Oman's foreign minister, who had mediated with Iran, said of the war: "this is not America's war" (quoted by Stimson). On February 27, 2026, the evening before the attack, Oman announced a "breakthrough": Iran reportedly agreeing never to stockpile enriched uranium and to accept full inspection (as described in a captured essay that calls itself interpretation). The bombs fell the next morning.
What the Gulf paid
Iran's retaliation hit the countries that host American bases. Rep. Jared Moskowitz listed U.S. bases and personnel "in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Oman, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Kuwait – all of which are currently under attack by Iran" (Moskowitz on X, March 5, 2026). A CSIS count found the UAE alone was attacked by 1,422 drones and 246 missiles in eight days (as quoted by @jurgen_nauditt on X, March 23, 2026). An analysis concluded that "Despite its access in Washington, the UAE had little apparent influence over decisions that brought a major conflict to its doorstep" (Eye OSINT). Five Air Force refueling planes were hit in an Iranian strike on Saudi Arabia (WSJ headline listed by Michael Every, March 14, 2026).
When the Crown Prince asked again
By September 2026, with Houthi forces advancing on Yemen's Red Sea coast and striking Saudi Arabia, the crown prince called the President twice, the second time asking for American strikes. The President refused both times, according to one detailed account (@SMO_VZ, September 12, 2026); analyst Derek Grossman: "when MBS asked Trump to retaliate, he said no" (Grossman on X, September 16, 2026). The reason offered in one analysis: the Iran war had already emptied the magazines. Saudi Arabia's request for war against Iran was answered; its request for help against Iran's allies was not.
What it adds
The Gulf story strengthens, rather than weakens, the thesis of this section. The war was not an American decision reached on American security grounds: U.S. intelligence "saw no imminent threat." It was a decision pressed on the President by foreign governments, Israel first and loudest, with Saudi Arabia privately alongside, both deeply tied to Washington by money and weapons.
Status: Mohammed bin Salman, Benjamin Netanyahu, Masoud Pezeshkian, Hamad bin Jassim, Jared Moskowitz, Derek Grossman, and Donald Trump are alive.
Sources
- Washington Post, March 1, 2026 (Birnbaum, Hudson, DeYoung, Allison, Mekhennet), as captured from an X search page.
- Stimson Center, August 3, 2026.
- @SMO_VZ on X, September 12, 2026.
- Randy Ferrell on X, September 2, 2026.
- Eye OSINT on X, August 10, 2026.
- FDD's Iran Program on X, March 1, 2026.
- Moskowitz on X, March 5, 2026.
- @jurgen_nauditt on X, March 23, 2026.
- Michael Every on X, March 14, 2026.
- Derek Grossman on X, September 16, 2026.
Related Areas
Last Updated: 2026-09-26