The 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States)

The official investigation into the September 11 attacks was initially opposed by the Bush administration, underfunded, riddled with conflicts of interest, and its own members later said it was compromised, obstructed, and set up to fail.

Field	Details
Type	Government Investigation
Established	November 27, 2002
Final Report	July 22, 2004
Location(s)	Washington, DC
Active Period	2002-2004
Status	Completed
Key Claim	The commission was structurally compromised by conflicts of interest, obstruction, underfunding, and a predetermined scope that excluded key evidence
Evidence Rating	WELL-DOCUMENTED

Overview

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission, was established on November 27, 2002 -- more than 14 months after the attacks -- to provide a "full and complete accounting" of the September 11, 2001 attacks and to recommend measures to prevent future attacks.

The commission's creation was itself a battle. The Bush administration initially opposed an independent investigation. The 9/11 families -- particularly the group known as the "Jersey Girls" (Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Lorie Van Auken, and Mindy Kleinberg) -- waged a sustained public campaign to force the investigation into existence.

What makes the 9/11 Commission central to the cover-up narrative is not speculation but the documented testimony of its own members and staff. Commissioner Max Cleland called it "a national scandal." Senior counsel John Farmer stated that the government's account was "almost entirely, and inexplicably, untrue." The commission's budget, scope, timeline, staffing, and leadership all raise documented concerns about whether it was designed to succeed or to manage the narrative.

Key Activities & Evidence

Initial Opposition and Delays

The Bush administration actively opposed the creation of an independent commission for over a year after 9/11.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney personally lobbied Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle to limit the scope of any investigation.
The commission was not established until November 2002, 14 months after the attacks.

Henry Kissinger as First Chairman

President Bush initially appointed Henry Kissinger as chairman of the commission. Kissinger resigned on December 13, 2002, just weeks after his appointment, citing conflicts of interest. He refused to disclose his business clients, some of whom reportedly included members of the Saudi royal family and the Bin Laden family through his consulting firm Kissinger Associates. His selection was widely criticized as a signal that the investigation was not intended to be independent.

Philip Zelikow as Executive Director

Philip Zelikow was appointed as the commission's executive director, effectively controlling its day-to-day operations, staffing, and investigative direction. Zelikow had extensive conflicts of interest:

He co-authored a book with incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 1995)
He served on the Bush transition team in 2000-2001
He was responsible for restructuring the National Security Council during the transition, which demoted Richard Clarke and his counter-terrorism team
He was the secret author of a white paper providing intellectual justification for the doctrine of pre-emptive war, which was used to justify the Iraq invasion
Commission investigator Dana Lesemann reported that Zelikow "consistently sought to blunt" inquiries into Saudi involvement with the hijackers
Zelikow blocked staff requests to interview certain persons of interest and obtain certain documents

According to journalist Philip Shenon's book The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation (2008), Zelikow had far closer ties to the White House than he publicly disclosed and attempted to influence the final report in ways that limited the Bush administration's accountability.

Budget: $3 Million vs. $50 Million

The 9/11 Commission was initially given a budget of approximately $3 million and 18 months to complete its work. For comparison:

The investigation into the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster received $50 million
The Whitewater/Clinton-Lewinsky investigation cost approximately $52 million
The investigation of the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster cost $75 million

The commission later received an additional $9 million (the administration provided $9 million rather than the $11 million the commission requested), for a total of approximately $12 million -- still a fraction of comparable investigations. Commission chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton stated publicly that the commission was "hamstrung by the time and budgetary constraints it was under."

Commissioners

Thomas Kean (Chairman) -- Former Governor of New Jersey
Lee Hamilton (Vice Chairman) -- Former US Representative from Indiana
Max Cleland -- Former US Senator from Georgia (resigned, replaced by Bob Kerrey)
Richard Ben-Veniste -- Attorney, former Watergate prosecutor
Fred Fielding -- Attorney, former White House Counsel under Reagan
Jamie Gorelick -- Former Deputy Attorney General (criticized for conflicts of interest due to "the wall" memo)
Slade Gorton -- Former US Senator from Washington
Bob Kerrey -- Former US Senator from Nebraska (replaced Cleland)
John Lehman -- Former Secretary of the Navy
Timothy Roemer -- Former US Representative from Indiana

Commissioner Max Cleland's Resignation

Max Cleland, a decorated Vietnam veteran and former US Senator who lost three limbs in combat, resigned from the commission in December 2003. Before departing, he made a series of extraordinary public statements:

"It is a national scandal." -- Max Cleland, quoted in the Boston Globe, November 2003

"I cannot look any American in the eye, especially family members of victims, and say the commission had full access. It's been deliberately slow-walked because the administration's strategy was to run out the clock."

"This is the most serious independent investigation since the Warren Commission. And the Warren Commission blew it. I'm not going to be part of that. I'm not going to be part of looking at information only partially. I'm not going to be part of just coming to quick conclusions. I'm not going to be part of political pressure to do this, or not do that."

Cleland was offered and accepted a position on the board of directors of the Export-Import Bank -- a presidential appointment that critics described as a buyout to remove a troublesome commissioner.

John Farmer's Assessment

John Farmer Jr., the commission's senior counsel, wrote in his 2009 book The Ground Truth: The Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11:

"At some level of the government, at some point in time... there was an agreement not to tell the truth about what happened... The 9/11 Commission discovered that what government and military officials had told Congress, the Commission, the media, and the public about who knew what when -- was almost entirely, and inexplicably, untrue."

Key Omissions from the Final Report

The 9/11 Commission's 585-page final report, published July 22, 2004, omitted or inadequately addressed:

WTC Building 7 -- The 47-story building that collapsed at 5:20 PM on 9/11 without being hit by a plane was not mentioned in the final report. The investigation into its collapse was deferred to NIST, which took until 2008 to issue its report.
Saudi government connections -- The 28 pages of the Congressional Joint Inquiry detailing evidence of Saudi government support for the hijackers were classified and excluded from the commission's public report. They were not declassified until 2016.
Able Danger -- A US military data-mining program that reportedly identified Mohamed Atta and other hijackers as threats before 9/11. Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer testified that commission staff were briefed on Able Danger but the information was excluded from the final report.
FBI whistleblowers -- While Coleen Rowley's testimony about FBI failures was acknowledged, other whistleblowers including Robert Wright (who testified that his terrorism financing investigation was systematically obstructed) and Sibel Edmonds (who was gagged by the DOJ) received inadequate coverage.
ISI wire transfer -- The reported $100,000 wire transfer from Pakistan's ISI to lead hijacker Mohamed Atta via Omar Saeed Sheikh was not substantively investigated. The report stated the source of hijacker funding "remains unknown." (See Pakistan ISI)
Insider trading -- The report dismissed the unusual put options placed on American Airlines and United Airlines stock before 9/11, attributing them to legitimate trading without thorough public accounting.
NORAD timeline discrepancies -- The commission found that NORAD and FAA officials provided inaccurate timelines of the military response on 9/11, but the implications were not fully explored.
Bush and Cheney testimony -- The President and Vice President testified together, not under oath, not recorded, not transcribed, and behind closed doors.

Bush and Cheney's Testimony Conditions

President Bush and Vice President Cheney agreed to meet with the commission only under the following conditions:

They would appear together, not separately
They would not testify under oath
No recording or transcript would be made
The meeting would be private, not public
Only commissioners (not staff) could attend
There would be no time limit set by the commission

These conditions were unprecedented for an investigation of this magnitude.

Key Figures

Philip Zelikow -- Executive Director; controlled the investigation's direction and had extensive conflicts of interest
Bob Graham -- Chaired the earlier Congressional Joint Inquiry; fought to declassify the 28 pages the commission did not address
Thomas Kean -- Commission Chairman
Lee Hamilton -- Commission Vice Chairman
Max Cleland -- Commissioner who resigned, calling it "a national scandal"
John Farmer Jr. -- Senior Counsel who later wrote that the government's testimony was "almost entirely untrue"
Richard Ben-Veniste -- Commissioner and former Watergate prosecutor
Bob Kerrey -- Commissioner who replaced Cleland
Dana Lesemann -- Commission investigator fired after clashing with Zelikow over Saudi investigation

Why This Group Matters

The 9/11 Commission is the official record of what happened on September 11, 2001. If the commission was compromised, then the official narrative rests on a flawed foundation. The documented evidence shows:

Structural conflicts of interest -- The executive director had direct ties to the administration being investigated
Deliberate underfunding -- The budget was a fraction of comparable investigations
Obstruction by the executive branch -- Delayed access to documents, restricted testimony conditions
Commissioner self-assessment -- Multiple commissioners and staff members publicly stated the investigation was inadequate
Systematic omissions -- Key evidence (WTC 7, Saudi connections, ISI wire transfer, Able Danger) was excluded or minimized
No accountability -- Despite the commission finding that official testimony was "almost entirely untrue," no one was prosecuted for lying to investigators

The pattern is consistent with an investigation designed to produce a manageable narrative rather than an unrestricted pursuit of truth.

Criticisms & Counter-Arguments

Resource constraints are normal. Government investigations frequently operate under budget and time pressure. The commission produced a comprehensive report despite these limitations.
Scope was appropriate. The commission's mandate was to investigate the attacks and recommend preventive measures, not to investigate every conspiracy theory. Focusing on actionable intelligence failures was a reasonable approach.
Zelikow's expertise was relevant. His background in government transitions and national security made him qualified for the role, and his prior relationship with Rice did not necessarily compromise his objectivity.
Omissions have explanations. WTC 7 was addressed by NIST's separate investigation. Saudi connections involved classified intelligence sources. Able Danger's claims were disputed by other intelligence officials.
Bipartisan commission. The commission included five Republicans and five Democrats, providing structural balance against partisan bias.

Philip Zelikow -- Controlled the commission as executive director while holding undisclosed conflicts of interest
Bob Graham -- Led the Joint Inquiry that produced the classified 28 pages the commission failed to address
PNAC -- The think tank whose members had the most to lose from a thorough investigation
Pakistan ISI -- The ISI wire transfer to Mohamed Atta that the commission said was from an "unknown" source
Urban Moving Systems -- Israeli intelligence operation on 9/11 that received no mention in the commission report

Sources

This information was compiled by Claude AI research.

Overview​

Key Activities & Evidence​

Initial Opposition and Delays​

Henry Kissinger as First Chairman​

Philip Zelikow as Executive Director​

Budget: $3 Million vs. $50 Million​

Commissioners​

Commissioner Max Cleland's Resignation​

John Farmer's Assessment​

Key Omissions from the Final Report​

Bush and Cheney's Testimony Conditions​

Key Figures​

Why This Group Matters​

Criticisms & Counter-Arguments​

Related Perspectives​

Other Coverage Worth Reading​

Sources​